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In my earlier paper, I argued against analysis by anecdote and for a careful eco-
nomic analysis of the costs and beneﬁ  ts which might be associated with the possible 
elimination of the penny. Robert Whaples has followed this lead and offered some 
welcome new evidence bearing on the question. As an economy evolves, the underlying 
dynamics driving prices and behavior affect estimates of costs and beneﬁ  ts, implying 
that periodic reassessments are a necessary element of sensible policy making.
Whaples points out that the surge in zinc prices, along with the fact that the penny 
is comprised of about 97.5 percent zinc, implies that the previous seigniorage earned 
by the US Mint on the penny has disappeared; indeed, for ﬁ  scal year 2006, the Mint 
estimates the cost of producing and distributing a penny at about 1.23 cents. Assuming 
that the higher level of zinc prices persists, this development, along with the ongoing 
decline in the purchasing power of the penny which accompanies the increases in the 
overall price level, could well represent a necessary but not a sufﬁ  cient condition for 
eliminating the penny.
The distinction between necessary and sufﬁ  cient conditions is important. First, the 
alloys used to produce the penny could be altered to lower production costs, as was the 
case in 1982, when the price of copper soared and the composition of the penny was 
changed from 95 percent copper to 97.5 percent of the then much less expensive zinc. 
Second, seigniorage is but one of an array of issues one must consider in estimating 
the net beneﬁ  ts or net costs of eliminating the penny. More speciﬁ  cally, the effects 
of eliminating the penny on pricing, including my earlier discussion of a “rounding 
tax” and more recent research bearing on “strategic pricing,” are crucial. To sharpen 
the point, the Mint estimates the cost of producing and distributing the nickel, as of 
July 2006 [Lebryk, 3], at approximately 7 cents; is anyone ready to argue we should 
eliminate the nickel and round to the nearest dime?
WHAPLES’ ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE ON ROUNDING
In contrast to the simulations which I ran with data from the price book from 
a convenience store chain, Whaples acquired data on actual transactions from a 
convenience store chain. While this is potentially useful, an important limitation, as 
Whaples acknowledges, is that the data mix together cash and non-cash transactions. 
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notes [Gerdes et al., 2005, 198], we know all too little about the number and average 
value of cash transactions.1 
The data, which Professor Whaples kindly provided, also include transactions 
comprised of both taxed and non-taxed items. Since the evidence presented leads 
him to conclude that sales taxes, along with multiple item purchases, eliminate the 
rounding tax, I have taken a closer look at this question. 
DO SALES TAXES MATTER?
The details of state and local sales taxes are constantly evolving and thus represent 
a “moving target” for anyone trying to analyze ﬁ  nancial and economic impacts. That 
said, there are certain common threads and key features of the way in which state 
sales taxes are set and administered. First, in many states food is exempt from such 
taxes. In fact, in the ten largest states (California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas), food is exempt 
(http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.html). This is noteworthy because these states 
account for 55 percent of total gross state product in the nation and thus the majority 
of transactions in the aggregate. Moreover, food purchases at convenience and grocery 
stores represent a large portion of total cash transactions, suggesting the existence of 
sales taxes may be much less important than Whaples has alleged.
A second and equally important consideration in analyzing the way in which sales 
taxes affect rounding is the convention whereby retailers are permitted to round up sales 
taxes. To illustrate, suppose the cash total on a purchase is $4.96 and the sales tax is 
4.5 percent and applies to all items ; the resulting price would be $5.1832, which would 
be rounded up to $5.19. The rationale for permitting the rounding up is that states are 
in effect compensating retailers for collecting the tax. Of particular importance for this 
note is the fact that the purchase ignoring taxes ($4.96) would be rounded down under 
the typical scheme suggested (i.e., prices ending in 1, 2, 6 and 7 are rounded down, 
prices ending in 3, 4, 8 and 9 are rounded up) from $4.96 to $4.95. However, the price 
with taxes would be rounded up twice, once from $5.1822 to $5.19 (sales tax rounding) 
and again from $5.19 to $5.20 (rounding in the absence of the penny).
Clearly, the existence of taxes can make a difference, but the direction of the effect 
is not obvious. Accordingly, I utilize my original data to quantify the several effects.
As in the previous study, I utilize the price book for a typical convenience store in 
a large chain of such stores in the mid-Atlantic region. I then simulate transactions 
involving the purchase of from one to three items where the ﬁ  nal sum is not taxable 
and when it is subject to a 3, 5 and 7  percent tax. The tax rates are chosen for illus-
trative purposes; choosing other rates (or making only one of the items of a multiple 
item purchase taxable) would not alter the general contour of the results reported 
below. Each transaction represents, in effect, a single customer purchasing a random 
set of from one to three items from among all those available in the store. The bill is 
calculated for each transaction. Then, in the no tax case, column (1) in the table below, 
the rounding scheme typically proposed is applied. In the case of taxes, columns (2)-
(4), the bill is calculated for each transaction, the particular sales tax rate is applied, 
rounded up to the nearest penny, and then the rounding scheme is applied.149 PENNIES, PRICING, AND ROUNDING
  Net Rounding with Sales Taxes
  (in dollars per 1000 transactions)
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Number of  No  3%  5%  7%
Items Purchased  Sales Tax  Sales Tax  Sales Tax  Sales Tax
1 9.11  1.09  5.04  3.85
1-2 13.01  2.66  4.57  4.09
1-3 3.90  3.42  4.80  4.38
The results in the table can be read as follows: when up to two items are purchased 
and there is no sales tax, the net rounding in a random set of 1000 transactions is $13.01. 
When sales taxes apply to the same set of transactions, the net rounding up is smaller, 
$2.66 to $4.57, depending on the tax rate. Similarly, when up to three non-taxable items 
are purchased, net rounding up is $3.90; and when sales taxes apply, net rounding up in 
a range of $3.42 to $4.80 occurs. Interestingly, in some separate simulations (not shown), 
if exactly three items are purchased 1000 times and no sales taxes apply, there is net 
rounding down. But when the various tax rates are applied, there is net rounding up.
Thus, sales taxes matter in the sense that the degree of net rounding changes 
across different scenarios. However, with well over 100 billion transactions a year 
in the United States, and perhaps 50-70 billion or more of those in cash (see note 1 
and [Gerdes et al., 2005]), the aggregate amount of net rounding up would still be in 
the hundreds of millions of dollars at a minimum, even if all goods were taxed. For 
example, if the average amount of rounding up is 0.5 cents per transaction (taking 
say $5.00 from calculations such as those in the table above, and dividing by 1000), 
the economy-wide rounding up, ignoring all other factors, would be 50 or 70 billion 
x 0.5, or $250-350 million. Of course, we know that, in fact, a large portion of cash 
purchases are tax exempt. Put simply, there is little evidence to support the assertion 
that multiple purchases in combination with sales taxes would eliminate net rounding, 
even if we ignore strategic pricing by retailers, a topic to which we now turn.
STRATEGIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRICING
In my original paper, I suggested that in a penny-less world with rounding we 
could well see strategic pricing behavior by ﬁ  rms to take advantage of rounding 
schemes. Whaples has suggested that competitive pressures will limit or eliminate 
such strategic behavior, such that the effects would be “trivially small.”
Since my original paper, a rich and growing literature has addressed the notion of 
strategic and psychological pricing by ﬁ  rms and rational inattention to the rightmost 
digits of prices by consumers (see Levy et al., [2006] and the references cited therein).2 
As this literature makes clear, one does not need to abandon the competitive model 
or rationality as central tenets of economic theory and analysis. Rather strategic 
pricing, “may be an outcome of ﬁ  rms’ optimal reactions to consumers’ rational inat-
tention to the rightmost digits of prices…. (R)ational inattention by consumers arises 
for at least two reasons. First, consumers face huge amounts of information, which is 
costly to gather, absorb, and process. Second, they have time, resource, and cognitive 
information processing-capacity constraints” [ Levy et al., 2006, 12].
The implication is that representative consumers in effect “ignore” small price changes, 
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it be to set prices at a psychologically attractive ﬁ  gure to the consumer, for example, a 
price ending in a “9,” or in a manner to take advantage of any rounding scheme accom-
panying the elimination of the penny, or both. Of particular relevance to the issues under 
examination here, Levy and his colleagues ﬁ  nd that the distribution of price changes over 
eight years for a large retail grocery chain is not random; they are asymmetric, more price 
increases than decreases, and over 35 percent of the price changes were in multiples of 
ten cents, thereby preserving the price’s last digit [Levy et al., 2006, 7]. 
As many, including Levy and his colleagues, note such ﬁ  ndings suggest European 
retailers may have acted opportunistically by rounding their prices upward after con-
version to the Euro in an attempt to preserve psychological prices, and, more generally, 
to take advantage of consumer inattention. Since the conversion to the Euro offers a 
real world natural experiment akin in some respects to a possible elimination of the 
penny, the experience is worth a closer look.
CONVERSION TO THE EURO
In early 2002 the introduction of the Euro changed nominal prices in all member 
states of the European Monetary Union. Prices stated in the home currency had to be 
converted to a price in Euros. The conversion disturbed psychologically set prices and, 
more generally, given that the conversions created prices in fractions of cents, raised 
questions about rounding. Much ink was spilled on this question leading up to the 
currency shift and government ofﬁ  cials claimed that they would monitor closely the 
resulting pattern of price adjustments. When the dust settled, Eurostat, the European 
Commission’s statistical service, estimated that the impact on the Harmonized Index 
of Consumer Prices, was approximately 0.2 percent. Interestingly, they found that the 
price increases were more signiﬁ  cant in the services sector and in certain low-price 
goods bought frequently. For example, price increases in cafes and restaurants were 
about 4.3 percent over the ﬁ  rst year of conversion, almost double the general inﬂ  ation 
rate (see the report by the Commission of the European Communities, 2002). To state 
the obvious, the price increases were largest for those transactions most likely to be 
in cash. Interestingly, in a November 2002 survey of public opinion across the Euro 
area, “84.4 percent of the respondents in the euro area thought that prices had been 
converted rather to the detriment of consumers and 10.9 percent thought that price 
rises and decreases were balanced” [Commission of the European Communities, 18]. 
In a careful and wide ranging empirical study, Ehrmann [2006] argues the conversion 
increased information processing costs for consumers in a manner that helps explain 
the pattern of price increases observed and consumer perceptions of inﬂ  ation.
Were the price increases resulting from conversion “large” or “small”? All the 
analysis I am aware of suggests the price increases traced to conversion are small 
relative to the longer run beneﬁ  ts of a common currency associated with the increased 
trade, economic growth and development of the European community. 
BENEFITS?
Comparing the costs of conversion to the beneﬁ  ts of a common currency is im-
portant because even if we ignore the evidence on the cost of keeping vs. eliminating 
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be associated with the elimination of the penny. To be sure, some might refer to the 
elimination of negative seigniorage discussed above as a beneﬁ  t. Beyond this, there 
is the contention that making change is “costly.” However, there is less to this truism 
than proponents of penny elimination contend. Whaples and others seem to imply 
that the cost to the retailer of the consumer using a non-cash payment medium, be it 
credit or debit card or a check, is either zero, or substantially below the cost of making 
change. There is no credible evidence I am aware of that supports this inference. In 
fact, common experience and industry data suggest the opposite is true. More speciﬁ  -
cally, common everyday experience conﬁ  rms that the “time at the register” cost for 
non-cash media is certainly not shorter, and to this cost we must add the fees and 
other processing costs associated with checks and electronic payments. The latter 
costs, as discussed in Lofstock [2006], and a host of other like sources, are cutting 
deeply into convenience store proﬁ  ts.
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
Whaples offers modest evidence on my contention that the costs associated with 
elimination of the penny are likely to fall disproportionally on those at the lower end 
of the income distribution. I ﬁ  nd his comparison of the rounding outcomes in two 
stores in North Carolina, one in an afﬂ  uent section of Winston-Salem and one in a 
poorer section, unpersuasive. Setting the small sample size aside, of more potential 
relevance are his data for Pennsylvania, the only state for which he has detailed data 
for transactions below $5. The data show a cumulative loss (rounding tax) of $2.88 
for all transactions totaling less than $5; but for transactions of less than $4, $3, $2 
and $1, respectively, the loss to consumers is $4.90, $4.16, $3.11, and $4.91. Clearly, 
those making smaller transactions are more likely to lose from rounding, regardless 
of how many items comprise the transaction.
The most recent Federal Reserve survey of family ﬁ  nances in the United States 
showing that “Families that did not have any type of transaction account in 2004 were 
disproportionately likely to have low incomes, to be headed by a person younger than 
35, to be nonwhite or Hispanic, to be headed by a person who was neither working 
nor retired, to be renters, or to have relatively low levels of wealth” [Bucks et al., 
2006, A12], and to be unlikely to have credit or debit cards, is clearly relevant to the 
distributional question. By deﬁ  nition, such families engage in mostly cash transac-
tions. This fact dovetails with the evidence available from the conversion to the Euro 
suggesting that it is the lower priced, most frequently purchased items most likely to 
exhibit upward price rounding, that is, those transactions most likely to be paid for 
in cash. With such transactions most likely to be unevenly distributed across income 
classes, it seems to me that the claim that net price rounding upward will be small 
or non-existent with minimal or non-existent distributional effects is still based on a 
weak statistical and analytical foundation.
WHAT DOES THE PUBLIC THINK?
It seems the public, a group economists are usually fully prepared to assume act 
rationally, except perhaps when the answers they give to surveys are not consistent 
with one’s theorizing, are not convinced that the adverse effects of eliminating the 152 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
penny will be small. Leaving aside an impossible to quantify nostalgia factor, the most 
recent Coinstar survey [2006], indicates that 76 percent of Americans favor keeping 
the penny, up more than 10 percentage points from 2005; interestingly, in a recent 
USA Today/Gallup poll, reported by Hagenbaugh [2006], utilizing somewhat differ-
ent questions, the percentage of Americans that favor keeping the penny increases 
signiﬁ  cantly as incomes fall. 
SUMMING UP
As Lincoln said, albeit in a very different context, “With public sentiment, nothing can 
fail, without it, nothing can succeed” [Basler, 1953, “Lincoln-Douglas Debate at Ottawa,” 
27]. Given public sentiment, the experience with the introduction of the Euro, accumulation 
of other evidence suggesting strategic pricing is not just a theoretical curiosum, and the 
fact that available evidence suggests eliminating the penny would not be distributional 
neutral, I think Professor Whaples’ conclusions are, to put it gently, premature. 
 ENDNOTES
1.  For example, in an often referenced and allegedly authoritative study, jointly undertaken with the 
American Bankers Association, Dove Consulting [2006] ﬁ  nds that the proportion of in-store cash pay-
ments has remained roughly constant at 33 percent over the last six years. Interestingly, the data are 
from 3008 completed surveys of consumers, 78 percent of which were submitted via the Web. One must 
question the applicability of such a methodology, particularly in view of the digital divide that limits 
the access of those with low incomes to computers and the internet. Since those at the lower end of 
the income distribution are most likely to engage in a disproportionate volume of cash transactions, 
the study probably underestimates the volume of cash transactions by a non-trivial amount.
2.  Psychological pricing is usually linked to the frequently observed practice of ending a price with the 
digit “9,” thereby making the price appear to be well below the following round number.
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